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We construct a Schumpeterian growth theory consistent with the divergence in per-capita income
that has occurred between countries since the mid 19th Century, and with the convergence that occurred
between the richest countries during the second half of the 20th Century. The theory assumes that
technological change underwent a transformation late in the 19th Century, associated with modern R&D
labs. Countries sort themselves into three groups. Those in the highest group converge to a steady state
where they do leading edge R&D, while those in the intermediate group converge to a steady state where
they implement technologies developed elsewhere. Countries in both of these groups grow at the same
rate in the long run, as a result of technology transfer, but inequality between them increases during the
transition. Countries in the lowest group grow at a slower rate, with relative incomes that fall
asymptotically to zero. Once modern R&D has been introduced, a country may have only a finite window
of opportunity in which to introduce the institutions that support it.
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peter_howitt@brown.edu￿The greatest invention of the 19th Century was the invention of the method of inven-
tion.￿ Alfred North Whitehead (1931, p. 98)
￿Countries that are technologically backward have a potentiality for generating growth
more rapid than that of more advanced countries, provided their social capabilities are
suﬃciently developed to permit successful exploitation of technologies already employed
by the technological leaders.￿ Moses Abramovitz (1986, p.225)
￿Lack of investment in an area of expertise early on may foreclose the future develop-
ment of a technical capability in that area.￿ Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal (1990,
p.128)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The cross-country distribution of per-capita income has widened dramatically since the 19th Cen-
tury. Pritchett (1997) infers that the proportional gap in living standards between the richest
and poorest countries grew more than ￿ve-fold from 1870 to 1990, in what he calls ￿divergence,
big-time.￿ According to the tables in Maddison (2001) the proportional gap between the richest
group of countries and the poorest1 grew from 3 in 1820 to 19 in 1998. Quah (1993, 1997) ￿nds
evidence of emerging ￿twin peaks￿ in the cross-country income distribution continuing well into the
second half of the 20th Century. Kremer et al. (2001) ￿nd that a single-peaked distribution may
emerge but only after a prolonged transition. Mayer (2001) ￿nds twin peaks in the distribution of
life expectancy using the available data for 1962 to 1997.
A large number of empirical studies2 have shown that the large income diﬀerences that have
emerged are mostly attributable to diﬀerences in productivity rather than to the diﬀerences in
schooling and capital accumulation invoked by neoclassical growth theory. In particular, Feyrer
(2001) ￿nds that although the distribution of capital-output ratios is single-peaked, and the distri-
bution of education levels is almost ￿at, the distribution of the productivity residual has become
increasingly twin-peaked. These studies strongly suggest that the central factor beneath growing
cross-country income disparities is technology.
There is however a major problem facing any technological explanation of divergence. Speci￿-
cally, many studies3 show that a large group of countries have been converging to parallel growth
1T h er i c h e s tg r o u pw a sW e s t e r nE u r o p ei n1 8 2 0a n dt h e￿ E u o p e a nO ﬀshoots￿ (Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the United States) in 1998. The poorest group was Africa in both years.
2See for example Knight et al. (1993), Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997),
Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Easterly and Levine (2001).
3For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Evans (1996).
1paths over the past 50 years or so. The tendency to convergence4 among rich countries is easy
to understand as a manifestation of technology transfer. But what force was opposing technology
transfer so as to produce the technological divergence that took place over the longer period from
the mid 19th Century? And why did that force stop working during the second half of the 20th
Century?
Moreover, this modern convergence group does not include all countries. In particular, the
gap between the leading countries as a whole and the very poorest countries as a whole continued
to widen throughout the second half of the 20th Century. For example, the proportional gap in
per-capita income between Mayer￿s (2002) richest and poorest convergence groups grew by a factor
of 2.6 between 1960 and 1995, and the proportional gap between Maddison￿s richest and poorest
groups grew by a factor of 1.75 between 1950 and 1998. This raises the further question of why the
forces that brought an end to the divergence among middle-to-high income countries did not also
bring an end to the divergence between very rich and very poor countries.5
Our purpose here is to show how these questions can be addressed by modern Schumpeterian
growth theory. To this end we propose a model of economic growth based on the multi-country
model of Howitt (2000), which in turn is an extension of the Aghion-Howitt (1992, 1998) model
of growth through creative destruction, and which implies a particular form of club-convergence.
Speci￿cally, in the earlier multi-country model all countries that continue to invest in new technolo-
gies eventually grow at the same rate, because they draw ideas from each other, whereas countries
that do not invest in new technologies stagnate, because without making technology investments
of their own they cannot bene￿t from technology transfer.
One problem with the earlier model of Howitt (2000) is that it does not take into account that
diﬀerent countries have used diﬀerent strategies for tapping into the global technological frontier.
Only a small handful of rich countries perform leading-edge R&D. In 1996, for example, 5 countries
accounted for over 80 percent of the world￿s formal R&D expenditures, and 11 countries accounted
4We use the term ￿convergence￿ throughout to mean that countries approach parallel long-run growth paths.
For emphasis we sometimes refer to the concept as ￿parallel convergence.￿ Although the neoclassical growth model
with instantaneous technology transfer exhibits parallel convergence, nevertheless the concept is not the same as the
more familiar ￿conditional convergence,￿ which means (Galor, 1996) that countries with the same characteristics
converge to the same growth path. For example, in the case of multiple steady states of the sort illustrated in Figure
3 below, countries with the same characteristics but diﬀerent initial conditions could converge to diﬀerent growth
paths (an example of club-convergence) but these paths would all be parallel. Conversely, in a model of conditional
convergence, countries with one set of characteristics could all converge to a growth path that was not parallel to
the common asymptotic path of countries with a diﬀerent set of characteristics. Thus parallel convergence does not
imply and is not implied by the usual concept of conditional convergence.
5(Except for a small number of formerly poor ￿miracle￿ countries such as Botswana, China, Mauritius and the
East Asian NICs).
2f o ro v e r9 5p e r c e n t . 6 Yet not all of the other countries stagnated relative to the frontier. As
E v e n s o na n dW e s t p h a l( 1 9 9 5 )d o c u m e n t ,ac o u n t r yc a n n o tk e e pu pw i t ht h ef r o n t i e rm e r e l yb y
copying technologies developed in leading countries, because technological knowledge is often tacit
and circumstantially sensitive. Therefore countries that avoided stagnation without performing
leading edge R&D must have made signi￿cant technology investments to learn, modify, adapt and
implement technologies that were originally developed elsewhere.
These technology investments in follower countries share many features with the R&D activity
that takes place in leading countries, in that they are costly, they build on knowledge developed
elsewhere, their eﬀects are random, and when successful they result in innovations - products or
processes that were previously not feasible in that country. But they are not the same as leading-
edge R&D. Instead they are closer to the production process, involve less basic science, generate
fewer spillovers to other countries, and generally contain a smaller element of novelty and a larger
element of dependency on preceding innovations.
Another problem with the earlier model is that although there is considerable evidence for
club-convergence,7 not even those countries at the bottom of the distribution have been completely
stagnant technologically as the earlier model implies. According to Maddison￿s (2001) tables, per-
capita income in the poorest group of countries (Africa) grew by 60 percent from 1950 to 1998.
What is needed to account for the record of very poor countries is a model in which a country
that invests in technological change can have a long-run growth rate that is positive but strictly
less than the rate of growth of the leading countries, despite the fact that technology transfer is
constantly exerting a force towards parallel convergence.
The present model deals with these two problems by taking into account two central features of
technological change not considered by Howitt (2000). First, we distinguish between two types of
technological investment, corresponding to the diﬀerent strategies that countries have for tapping
into the global technology frontier, namely ￿modern R&D￿ and ￿implementation.￿ The former
(which for brevity we refer to as simply ￿R&D￿) is what goes on in the most technologically
advanced countries, while the latter is the process of assimilation and adaptation that takes place in
less advanced countries. We suppose that both kinds of technology investment are costly, and both
draw on the world￿s technology frontier, but R&D draws more heavily on scienti￿ck n o w l e d g ea n d
its institutions, and thus requires higher skill levels than implementation. In particular, graduating
6These calculations are made using data from Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators and
the Penn World Tables 5.6.
7Baumol (1986), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), and Mayer (2001, 2002).
3from implementation to R&D requires surpassing a threshold skill level that increases with the
demands of new, ever advancing, leading technologies.
The second central feature we take into account is that a country￿s ability to acquire the
skills used intensively in technology investment depends on its level of development, relative to
the global technological frontier from which it draws new ideas. Thus a given time input into
schooling/training will produce few eﬀective skills in a country that is technologically backward,
because learning takes place in an environment where modern technology is relatively unfamiliar,
teachers are not as well versed in modern techniques, classrooms and labs are less up-to-date, and
so forth. Therefore as the world￿s technological frontier advances, a country that does not keep
pace will ￿nd it increasingly diﬃcult to catch up by absorbing foreign knowledge, because its skill
levels will not be keeping up with the frontier. As a result its technology investments will become
increasingly ineﬀective.8
This erosion of absorptive capacity that takes place when a country falls behind is a central
part of our explanation of long-term divergence. It weakens the force of technology transfer that
is tending to bring about parallel convergence. Followers of Gerschenkron (1952) have argued that
technological backwardness conveys an advantage, because the ability to make use of frontier ideas
raises the potential size of the advance that can be made by investing in technological change.
This advantage will be present in the model to be developed below, but the erosion of absorptive
capacity constitutes a counteracting disadvantage to technological backwardness.
O u rc e n t r a lh y p o t h e s i si st h a tt h ea c t i v i t yw ec a l lR & Dw a sm a d ep o s s i b l ei nt h el a t e1 9 t h
Century by the introduction of the modern R&D lab that exploited the growing interconnections
between science and technology, and by the existence of various institutions such as government
research labs and agencies, scienti￿c academies, universities with close ties to industry and com-
merce, and so forth.9 Before this, all technological change took the form of a pragmatic creativity
that we have loosely characterized as technological implementation.
The introduction of modern R&D was the fundamental driving force behind the emergence of
large income disparities. It worked by creating a fundamental change in the dynamic evolution of
global productivity diﬀerences, resulting in three distinct converge groups as illustrated in Figure
8See Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Griﬃth et al. (2001) for evidence that skills are an important determinant
of a country￿s absorptive capacity.
9Edison￿s research lab in Menlo Park, generally considered the ￿rst modern ￿invention factory,￿ opened in 1876.
Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986, ch.8) provide a brief account of the rise of the modern R&D lab and the increasing
interconnectedness between science and technology, which they argue began around 1875. Mowery and Rosenberg
(1998, ch.2) and Wright (1999) argue that a network of linkages between universities, government agencies and
commercial enterprises played a key role in establishing America￿s technological leadership in many ￿elds.
41. A sketch of our argument goes as follows.
Suppose modern R&D is introduced at time t0. Until then all countries were on parallel growth
paths, with some level-diﬀerences attributable to diﬀerences in country-speci￿c parameters. Figure
1 depicts the evolution of productivity in three countries, one in each convergence group. Country
A has the ￿best￿ parameter values (i.e. those most favorable to growth) and country C the worst.
After t0 only those countries whose productivity level is above some critical value will have a skilled
enough labor force to begin using modern R&D immediately. (In Figure 1 this is only country A.)
Those that do will start growing faster as a result of using the more productive (R&D) method of
technology investment. All others will continue using implementation, and will start to fall further
behind country A.
As the other countries fall further behind, technology transfer will start to pull their growth
rates up, but until their growth rates have caught up with the growth rate of the frontier, the
erosion of absorptive capacity engendered by their increasing technological backwardness will tend
to weaken the force of technology transfer. In countries that are not too far behind to start with,
absorptive capacity will remain strong enough to eventually put them on growth paths parallel
to that of country A, but with a permanently bigger gap in productivity levels, as in the case of
country B; the initial gap that was due to diﬀerent parameter values is now ampli￿ed by the fact
that country A has adopted modern R&D while country B has not. But if the country starts too
far behind (as with country C) then the erosion of absorptive capacity will weaken the force of
technology transfer to such an extent that, although the country will continue to grow forever, its
asymptotic growth rate will be strictly less than the common long-run growth rate of countries A
and B.
The above account presumes that all countries with suﬃcient skill levels to engage in R&D
also have the institutions required to support R&D. If this is not the case then, once R&D takes
hold in some leading economies, other economies may have a ￿nite window of opportunity in which
to establish the necessary institutions, and therefore to join the leading club. If this window is
missed, absorptive capacity may erode to such an extent that the country will become trapped
in technological implementation or even stagnation, and it will then take more than the right
institutions to rejoin the leaders.
The model is consistent with the dynamical features observed by Feyrer (2001) who notes that
the emergence of ￿twin peaks￿ in the distribution of world income is mainly attributable to diverging
rates of total factor productivity growth rather than diverging levels of capital accumulation or
5education. (We abstract completely from capital accumulation and in our model time spent in
education per person will be the same in each country.) As Feyrer notes, models constructing
development traps based on multiple equilibria in physical capital accumulation (such as Becker
and Barro, 1989; Murphy et al., 1989; Becker et al., 1990; Zilibotti, 1995; and Galor and Weil, 1996)
or in human capital accumulation (such as Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Tsiddon, 1992; Galor and
Zeira, 1993; Durlauf, 1993, 1996; Benabou, 1996; and Galor and Tsiddon, 1997) are inconsistent
with this observation.
The model is related to those of Basu and Weil (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), in
which follower countries are slow to adopt the leader￿s innovations because the technologies that
are being developed by the leader are not ￿appropriate￿ for the factor proportions being used in
production by the followers. In our model the followers are slow to adopt not because the technology
is inappropriate but because adopting requires ￿tacit￿ knowledge10 which is less accessible the
further removed is the adopter￿s everyday cultural and technological experience and skill level from
that of the innovator. Also, these other models describe steady states with unchanging cross-country
diﬀerences in productivity levels and identical growth rates, whereas we are trying to account for
divergent productivity growth rates.
The model is also related to a long literature, beginning with Gerschenkron (1952), maintaining
that institutional barriers are what prevent a country from catching up with technological lead-
ers. Abramovitz (1986) for example believed that technological backwardness conveys a growth
advantage by opening up the relatively easy path of adoption and imitation, but that ￿social back-
wardness￿ creates an oﬀsetting disadvantage. In our model the values of the various parameters
that determine the steady-state level of a country￿s growth path, and the presence or absence of the
institutions necessary for supporting modern R&D, might be considered as de￿ning some relevant
components of social backwardness. But in addition we argue that economic backwardness conveys
disadvantages (by eroding absorptive capacity) as well as advantages.
Our approach is similar to that of Nelson and Phelps (1966), who argue that a country￿s
productivity growth will be the product of a technology gap (to the world￿s technology leader) and
an absorptive capacity term which is a function of domestic skill levels (see their equation (8)). In
our model it is the product of a technology gap and the frequency of domestic innovations, the
latter being dependent on the level of ￿innovation-eﬀective￿ skills. (See equation (10) below.)
Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999) focus on legal and regulatory barriers to adopting foreign
10The importance of tacit knowledge for technological progress and development has been analyzed and docu-
mented by Arrow (1969) and Evenson and Westphal (1995).
6technology. Their model ignores the costs of technology adoption, arising from tacitness and cir-
cumstantial sensitivity, that make technology transfer less than automatic even in the absence of
such barriers. It also focuses on steady-state diﬀerences in productivity levels, rather than on di-
vergent productivity-growth rates. We see our model as being complementary with theirs, for one
of the key country-speci￿c parameters in our model determining convergence-group membership
(φ) represents the extent to which the legal/regulatory environment favors the creation/adoption
of new technology. Thus our model suggests that introduction of modern R&D has leveraged the
cross-country productivity diﬀerences due to adoption barriers that Parente and Prescott have
estimated to be quantitatively very large.
Acemoglu et al. (2002) complement our analysis by explicitly modeling one speci￿c mechanism
by which inappropriate institutions can prevent a country from using the best method of R&D.
They focus, as do Parente and Prescott (1999), on monopoly rights, which they argue can be growth
enhancing for a very backward country but can impede the switch from implementation to R&D.
The failure to switch prevents absolute convergence to the leader. However, they do not address
the issue of how large gaps arose, and in their analysis all countries converge to parallel growth
paths whether or not they adopt appropriate institutions.
Our model also gives an alternative explanation for the results obtained by Acemoglu et al.
(2001). In their study, a mortality variable constructed for the colonial era serves as an instrument
for modern institutions, explaining a substantial proportion of modern diﬀerences in income. The
authors argue that early settler mortality was amongst the determinants of the characteristics of
colonial states, ranging from extractive states to ￿Neo-Europes￿ (Crosby, 1986), that this status
determined their early institutions, especially with regard to property rights and checks against gov-
ernment power, that the institutions have persisted over time, and that the persistent institutions
continue to aﬀect economic growth.
We provide an alternative interpretation of their results, which does not rely upon an unex-
plained persistence of institutions. By their reasoning, colonial mortality and early institutions can
be expected to be correlated with the country-speci￿c parameters determining which convergence
g r o u pi tj o i n e dw h e nm o d e r nR & Dw a si n t r o d u c e d ,s p e c i ￿cally the eﬃciency of resource allocation
(the parameter ψ b e l o w ) ,a n dt h ei n c e n t i v e st os a v e( t h ep a r a m e t e rτ) and to innovate (φ). The
long-term character of these eﬀects results not from institutional persistence but from their eﬀects
on human capital and technology dynamics. Our ￿window of opportunity￿ result shows that the
economic diﬀerences caused by colonial experience can persist even if the institutions do not.
7Section 2 below lays out our basic model, under the assumption that there is just one method
for investing in technological change. It uses this model to analyze the determinants of the world
growth rate and of each country￿s relative productivity, both in and out of steady state, before the
introduction of modern R&D. Section 3 then shows what happens if we start in the steady state
and introduce modern R&D, assuming that some countries can use the new method but some lack
the necessary skill levels. It shows how countries sort themselves into the three convergence groups
depicted in Figure 1, under the assumption that all countries have in place the institutions that are
needed to support R&D. Section 4 then addresses the question of what happens if these institutions
are not in place in every country, and shows how this can create windows of opportunity. Section
5 contains our concluding remarks.
2 The basic model
Consider a world economy with m diﬀerent countries, connected to each other through a ￿ow of
technological ideas. For simplicity we ignore all other relationships between countries and assume
they do not exchange products or factors of production with each other. We begin by analyzing
an isolated country, in which there is just one method of technology investment; that is, before the
introduction of modern R&D. There is a unit mass of individuals, each with linear intertemporal
preferences in consumption, and a constant rate of time preference ρ > 0.
2.1 Production






where ψ is a country-speci￿ce ﬃciency parameter representing the combined eﬀects of the country￿s
institutions, policies, geography, and all other factors in￿uencing total factor productivity except
for technological knowledge; xt (i) is the country￿s input of intermediate product i into producing
￿nal output at t; G is a smooth production kernel with positive but diminishing marginal product;
and At (i) is a country-speci￿c technology parameter re￿ecting the productivity of intermediate
product i in the country at time t.
Each intermediate product is produced by skills, according to the production function:
xt (i)=SM
t (i)/At (i) (1)
8where SM
t (i) is the input of skills into manufacturing in sector i at t. Division by At (i) in (1)
indicates that successive vintages of the intermediate product are produced by increasingly skill-
intensive techniques. Each intermediate product is produced by a local monopolist, who operates
with a price schedule given by the marginal product function pt (i)=ψAt (i)G0 (xt (i)) and a cost
function wtAt (i)xt (i), where wt is the market-determined (and country-speci￿c) price of skills in
terms of the numeraire, ￿nal output.
Since each intermediate ￿rm￿s marginal revenue and marginal cost schedules are proportional
to At (i),a n ds i n c e￿rms diﬀer only in their value of At (i), they all choose to supply the same
quantity of intermediate product: xt = xt (i) for all i. Thus:
xt (i)=xt = SM
t /At (2)
where SM
t is the total demand for skills in manufacturing and At is the average productivity
parameter across all sectors in the country.11 Substituting from (2) into the pro￿t-maximization
c o n d i t i o no fe a c hi n t e r m e d i a t e￿rm yields the demand function for skills in manufacturing:
SM
t = Ate s(ωt)
where e s i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n 12 of the (country-speci￿c) ￿eﬃciency-adjusted￿ price of skills:
ωt ≡ wt/ψ.
Each local monopolist earns a ￿ow of pro￿ts proportional to its productivity parameter At (i),
namely:
πt (i)=At (i)ψb π(ωt) (3)
where the function13 b π is decreasing in ωt.
2.2 Supply of skills
Each individual acquires skills by spending time in ￿education,￿ which we broadly interpret to
include training. Someone who spends the fraction of time et in education at t (and the fraction
1 − et working in either manufacturing or technology investment) attains a skill level:
Ft = Atf (et); f0 > 0,f00 ≤ 0,f(0) = 0




0 At (i)xtdi = Atxt. Equation (2)
follows directly.
12For example, in the Cobb-Douglas case where G(x) ≡ x












9where At is again the economy-wide average productivity parameter and f is a production function
representing the technology of skill-acquisition. The level of At matters because of a human-capital
externality; that is, time spent acquiring skills is more valuable in a technologically more advanced
economy where there is more to learn from others.14
To simplify the dynamics we assume that skill acquisition takes place so much faster than
technological progress that we can treat it as being instantaneous. Thus a person who spends
the fraction of time et in education at date t to acquire the skill-level Ft will earn an income
of wtFt (1 − et) per unit of time. The person will maximize income by choosing et equal to the
constant:
b e ≡ argmaxf (e)(1− e)
independently of wt and At, and will supply the amount:
St = b σAt
of skills per unit of time to the market, where:
b σ ≡ f (b e)(1− b e).
2.3 Technological change
As in other Schumpeterian growth models, technology investment is targeted at speci￿ci n t e r m e d i -
ate products, results in a random sequence of innovations, and is performed by ￿rms that are not
already producing. As in Howitt (2000), we introduce an element of technology transfer by assum-
ing that each innovation creates an improved version of the existing product, with a productivity
parameter that equals the world-wide ￿leading-edge technology parameter:￿
Amax
t ≡ max{Ajt(i) | i ∈ [0,1],j=1 ,...,m}
where the j subscript denotes a variable speci￿ct oc o u n t r yj. The innovator becomes the new
incumbent producer until replaced by the next innovator in that industry in that country. Note
that this way of introducing technology transfer makes it analogous to and symmetrical with the
intersectoral technology spillovers occurring within a country, for the quality Amax
t of an innovation
depends on the most advanced technology in any sector of any country.
14What matters is that skills depend positively on the economy￿s technology level, not that this dependency
involves an externality. Thus we could have assumed instead that skill production involves a material input whose
price is independent of ωt. We chose the present alternative for its relative simplicity.
10The inputs to technology investment are skills and ￿nal output. Since the costs and bene￿ts
of this investment are the same in each sector, we assume that it is carried out at the same rate
in each sector. The Poisson arrival rate ￿t of an innovation in any sector (also the economy-wide
continuous ￿ow of innovations) is determined by a constant-returns production function, which is









t 0 < β < 1 (4)
where SR
t is the input of skills into technology investment, zt is the material input of the ￿nal good
into technology investment, and λ is the productivity of the innovation process. The division by
Amax
t takes into account the force of increasing complexity; as technology advances, the resource
cost of further advances increases proportionally.
Let Vt be the value (to the innovator) of an innovation at time t. Suppose that technology
investments are subsidized at the proportional rate φ < 1. The country-speci￿c parameter φ is a
proxy for all distortions and policies that impinge directly on the incentive to innovate. It can be
negative, in which case the distortions and policies favoring innovation are outweighed by those
discouraging it.15 Then a ￿rm investing in technology at t will maximize its expected pro￿t:










where ζ ≡ β−β (1 − β)






where ξ ≡ (βζ)
−1 .
By substituting for SR
t in (6) from the market-clearing condition for skills:
Atb σ = Ate s(ωt)+SR
t
15An increase in φ can be thought of as a reduction of the ￿barriers to adoption￿ stressed by Parente and Prescott
(1994, 1999), because technology transfer and innovation are all part of the same process in this model.
16We assume that there is always an equilibrium with a positive skill input to technology investment. (See footnote
23 below for further details). Otherwise (5) would have to be replaced by a pair of complementary Kuhn-Tucker
inequalities.
17Condition (5) follows from the fact that ζω





11we can express the equilibrium rate of innovation as:
￿t = λψ1−βe ￿(ωt)at (7)
where at ≡ At/Amax
t denotes the country￿s ￿normalized￿ productivity, and where e ￿ is an increasing
function18 of ωt.
To interpret (7) note ￿r s tt h a tah i g h e re ﬃciency-adjusted price ωt implies a lower demand for
skills in manufacturing and hence a larger supply to the technology investment sector; it also implies
that material input to technology investment will increase more than in proportion to the now
relatively more expensive skill input, and hence that the rate of innovation will also increase more
than in proportion. Next, a higher normalized productivity at implies that with a given amount
of education each worker engaged in technology investment will be supplying more skills relative
to the world technology frontier and hence will produce innovations at a faster rate. Conversely,
al o w e rv a l u eo fat means that the country is technologically more ￿backward￿, and the resulting
decrease in the frequency of innovations implied by (7) is the disadvantage of backwardness referred
to in Section 1 above.
2.4 The price of skills
The value Vt of an innovation is the expected present value of all the pro￿ts from now until the next









where r i st h er a t eo fi n t e r e s t .D i ﬀerentiating both sides with respect to t produces the analogue
to the Bellman equations of Aghion and Howitt (1992):
œ Vt/Vt − œ Amax
t /Amax
t = r + ￿t − ψb π (ωt)Amax
t /Vt. (8)





The country-speci￿c parameter τ is intended to proxy for all those aspects of the regulatory and
institutional environment impinging on the incentive to save, such as security of property rights,
etc.
18Speci￿cally: e ￿(ωt) ≡ ω
1−β
t ξ (b σ − e s(ωt)).
19We assume that the previous incumbent is unable to re-enter once it stops producing. That is why a successful
innovator can ignore potential competition from previous innovators in the same product. Howitt and Aghion (1998,
Appendix) show that the alternative case in which the previous incumbent is free to reenter produces the same
steady-state comparative-statics results in a related closed-economy model.

















where e π is a decreasing function20 of ωt.
2.5 Technology transfer and absorptive capacity
We have modelled technological innovation and technology transfer as two aspects of the same
technology investment activity, re￿e c t i n gt h ef a c tt h a te v e r ya c to fi n n o v a t i o nb u i l d so np r e v i o u s
ideas.21 Speci￿cally, each innovation allows the innovator to access a worldwide technological
frontier. Let gt denote the growth rate of this frontier:
gt ≡ œ Amax
t /Amax
t .
Although gt will be endogenous to the whole model, for now we take it as given.
A country￿s average productivity parameter At g r o w sa sar e s u l to fi n n o v a t i o n s ,e a c ho fw h i c h
replaces the pre-existing parameter At (i) in a sector by Amax
t . Thus the average increase in tech-
nology parameters across all innovating sectors at t is the diﬀerence Amax
t −At. T h er a t eo fi n c r e a s e
of the average equals the rate of innovation ￿t t i m e st h i sa v e r a g ei n c r e a s e :
œ At = ￿t (Amax
t − At)















The two eﬀects of at on the right-hand side of (10) represent respectively the advantage and
the disadvantage of backwardness as measured (inversely) by at. The advantage is that the further





t −1. This is the factor emphasized by followers of Gerschenkron.
The disadvantage is that the further behind (given the eﬃciency-adjusted price of skills ωt)t h e
smaller the frequency of innovations ￿t = λψ1−βe ￿(ωt)at. This results from erosion of absorptive
capacity as explained above.
According to (10) there is an overall advantage to backwardness, since the RHS is proportional
to 1 − at. But whether or not this overall advantage is suﬃcient to ensure that a follower country






21Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Griﬃth et al. (2001) provide empirical support for this two-sided nature of
technology investment.
13ends up growing at the same rate as a leader depends on the other factors involved in determining
the follower￿s frequency of innovations. In particular it will depend on the equilibrium value of the
eﬃciency-adjusted price of skills ωt in the follower country.
To see this, suppose ωt and gt are both constant. Then (10) and the de￿nitions of at and gt
imply:




0,1 − g/λψ1−βe ￿(ω)
o
.
Since e ￿ is an increasing function, this implies that when the steady-state value of ω is too small the
country￿s growth rate will converge to a value22 strictly less than the world growth rate g, whereas
when ω is large enough the growth rate will converge to g. In the former case, as the country
falls further behind the leader (as at falls), the country￿s absorptive capacity becomes too small to
prevent its normalized productivity at from falling to zero despite the increasing size of innovations.
In the latter case absorptive capacity remains high enough that normalized productivity is stabilized
at a strictly positive value.
2.6 The dynamical system
It follows that the evolution of a country￿s normalized productivity at and its eﬃciency-adjusted
























These equations, together with an initial condition on a0, a transversality condition on ωt deriving
from its connection (5) with the value Vt of an innovation, and a given time path for gt determine
au n i q u et i m ep a t hf o r(at,ωt) from 0 to ∞.
The phase diagram for a constant growth rate g>0 is shown in Figure 2.23 Note that ωt is
a forward-looking jump-variable in this perfect foresight system; that is, ωt is a translation of the
forward-looking expected value of an innovation, using the research arbitrage equation (5). The
22Speci￿cally: λψ
1−βe ￿(ω).
23The critical value ω of the eﬃciency-adjusted skill price depicted in Figure 2 is the value at which all skills would
be absorbed by the manufacturing sector. It is de￿ned by the equation: e s(ω)=b σ. As long as ω remains above ω
then our assumption of an interior solution to the research-arbitrage equation is warranted.
14diagram is constructed for given values of the parameters φ,ψ and τ,s oa ni n c r e a s ei nωt can be
interpreted as a ceteris paribus increase in the value of an innovation.
The œ a =0locus shows how steady-state productivity depends upon the price of skills. To
see why it is upward sloping note that, as explained in the previous paragraph, an increase in ω
corresponds to an increase in the value of an innovation, which induces a temporarily faster rate of
innovation, which leads to a higher steady-state level of productivity relative to the global leading
edge Amax
t . The œ ω =0locus shows how the steady-state price of skills depends on productivity.
It is downward sloping because the larger is the country￿s normalized productivity the greater is
the rate of innovation in any industry (because of the higher level of skills relative to the global
technology frontier), hence the higher the rate of creative destruction and the shorter the expected
duration of incumbency of a monopolist, hence the smaller the expected value of an innovation and
the lower the steady-state demand price for skills in technology investment.
There is a unique steady state, exhibiting the usual saddle-path property. At each date the
country￿s GDP equals the sum of labor income and pro￿ti n c o m e :
Yt = ωtSt + Atψb π(ωt)=At (ωtb σ + ψb π(ωt)). (13)
Since ωt is constant in the steady state, therefore the long-run growth rate of GDP is the steady
state productivity growth rate:
lim
t→∞
œ At/At =( 1− a∗)λψ1−βe ￿(ω∗).
There are two diﬀerent kinds of steady state, for the reasons discussed in section 2.5 above.
Figure 2a shows the case of an interior steady-state, in which at → a∗ > 0,a n dt h ec o u n t r y ￿ s
long-run growth rate equals g. All economies for which there exists such an equilibrium will be on
parallel growth paths in the long run, as a result of technology transfer.
Figure 2b shows the case in which there is long-run growth but at a rate below that of the
global technology frontier, because λψ1−βe ￿(ω∗) <g .Productivity and GDP fall to zero relative to
the countries in an interior equilibrium, because absorptive capacity becomes too low to keep up
with the frontier.
We suppose that before the introduction of modern R&D every country is in an interior steady
state, with a∗ > 0. As illustrated in Figure 1, all countries will be on strictly parallel growth paths,
growing at the same rate g>0.
152.7 Growth of the world economy
As in other innovation-based endogenous growth models, the growth rate gt of the world￿s leading-
edge technology parameter Amax
t is determined by a spillover process that constitutes part of the
mechanism of technology transfer (the other part being the use of Amax
t by innovators in every coun-
try). That is, the global technology frontier expands as a result of innovations everywhere, which






where the spillover coeﬃcients σj are all non-negative.
For simplicity, assume that there is one leading country, country 1, generating all the spillovers.
Then:
gt = σ1￿1t.
Using (7) to replace ￿1t and substituting into (11) for the leading country shows that its normalized






T h el e a d e r ￿ ss t e a d y - s t a t es k i l lp r i c eω∗
1 is determined by (14) and the other steady-state condition:












which follows from (12) and is analogous to the steady-state research arbitrage equations analyzed






2.8 Comparative statics of the steady state
The steady-state growth rate g of the global technological frontier depends on the leading country￿s
parameter values, according to:
Proposition 1 The steady-state global growth rate g is an increasing function of the leading coun-
try￿s eﬃciency parameter ψ1, its innovation-subsidy rate φ1 and the innovation-productivity para-
meter λ. It is a decreasing function of the leading country￿s saving-tax rate τ1.
24Spe￿cally, at must evolve according to:
œ a1t = a1t [1 − a1t (1 + σ1)]λψ
1−β
1 e ￿(ω1t).
16Proposition 1 is a fairly standard application of Schumpeterian growth theory to a closed econ-
omy. It follows directly from equations (14) ∼ (16). Note that the positive eﬀect of the eﬃciency
parameter ψ1 depends critically on our assumption that skills are not the only factor of production
in innovation - i.e. that β < 1. That is, although an increase in ψ1 increases the incentive to
innovate by raising the equilibrium level of pro￿t income in the leading economy, it also increases
the cost of innovation by raising the equilibrium price of skills in manufacturing. If skills were the
only input to innovation then the cost and reward would be increased in the same proportion and
so would the equilibrium price of skills, so there would be no change in the equilibrium level of
technology investment in the leading country and the growth rate would remain unchanged.25
F o re v e r yo t h e rc o u n t r y ,t h es t e a d y - s t a t ev a l u e so fa and ω can be derived from the equations:
1 − φ =
λψ1−βe π(ω)
ρ






describing the two stationary loci of Figure 2 above. The country￿s steady-state normalized pro-
ductivity depends on the same country-speci￿c parameters whose values in the leading country
determine the growth rate g, and in the same direction. Thus we have:
Proposition 2 Each non-leading country￿s steady-state normalized productivity a∗ is an increasing
function of its eﬃciency parameter ψ, its innovation-subsidy rate φ and the innovation-productivity
parameter λ. It is a decreasing function of its saving-tax rate τ and the growth rate g of the global
technology frontier.
The economic interpretation of these results is straightforward. Starting from a steady state
any parameter change that would have lead to a higher growth rate in a closed economy will raise
the equilibrium rate of innovation, causing the country￿s average productivity to grow faster than g
for some period of time. But the resulting decrease in the gap a−1
t −1 will reduce the average size of
innovations, thus bringing the rate of productivity growth back down. (This is just the technology
transfer eﬀect discussed in section 2.5 above, working in reverse.) Eventually productivity growth
will return to its original rate g but with a permanently higher value of a. Also, an increase in the
world growth rate g will ￿rst cause the country￿s average productivity to fall further behind the
global frontier, until technology transfer stabilizes a at a permanently lower value.
25The logic of this argument is the same as that of Howitt and Aghion (1998), who show that a subsidy to capital
accumulation will have a positive long-run eﬀect on growth except in the limiting case where β =1 .
173 The introduction of modern R&D
T h er i s eo fm o d e r ne c o n o m i cg r o w t hf o l l o w i n gt h e￿rst Industrial Revolution was closely associated
with the emergence of the scienti￿c way of thought.26 A new perspective of nature, founded on the
scienti￿c achievements of a new set of institutions, sustaining ever deeper advances of knowledge,
brought about a new era of technological change. From a technological point of view, this movement
culminated in the late 19th Century with the introduction of the modern R&D lab, and the growing
scienti￿c content of technological change.
Accordingly, we assume that until some date t0 productivity advances were based on a pragmatic
creativity occurring close to the production process, with innovation-productivity λ. Thereafter, an
alternative technology for R&D emerged, intimately linked with the scienti￿c revolution and its
institutions, with innovation-productivity λ0 > λ.
To be viable, however, the new technology requires workers with a skill level at least equal to
some threshold value γAmax
t , which depends upon the global technology frontier. It also requires
a set of supporting institutions, such as research-oriented universities, government R&D agencies
and research labs, and close links between academia, government and commerce. If workers do
not have this threshold level of skills then R&D yielding leading-edge technological innovation
is impossible, although the original process of pragmatic creativity remains. In the presence of
scienti￿c knowledge and advanced technologies this pragmatic process of innovation now takes on
the character of technological implementation.
Other than diﬀerent R&D productivities (λ0 instead of λ) and diﬀerent skill requirements and
institutional requirements, we assume that R&D and implementation work exactly the same way.
In particular, both involve an element of technology transfer because whichever method is used to
make an innovation, the innovation consists of a new intermediate product embodying the leading
edge technology parameter Amax
t . Thus in a country satisfying the minimal skill and institutional
requirements, the conversion from implementation to R&D can be represented simply by an increase
in the innovation-productivity parameter from λ to λ0.
We assume throughout this section that all countries have in place the institutions necessary to
support modern R&D.27 Therefore any country for which Ft ≥ γAmax





will be able to engage in R&D at date t.W es u p p o s et h a tt h i si st h ec a s ef o rt h el e a d e ri ni t si n i t i a l
26See Jacob (1997).







Therefore the leader will go immediately to a new equilibrium, with an unchanged normalized
productivity a1 =1 /(1 + σ1). According to Proposition 1 the growth rate of the global technology
frontier will increase to g0 >g .
3.1 Skill acquisition
Any other country satisfying (19) in the original steady state will also be able to use the method of
R&D. Indeed even if its normalized average productivity falls short of satisfying (19) it might pay
people to acquire enough extra skills so that they can engage in R&D rather than implementation.
Speci￿cally, de￿ne
σc (γ/at) ≡ max{f (e)(1− e)|f (e) ≥ γ/at}
and note that by construction:
σc (γ/at) ≤ b σ with equality if and only if f (b e) ≥ γ/at. (20)
A worker that chooses to supply skills to R&D will supply the amount σc (γ/at) per unit of time.
Suppose that workers are oﬀered a price w0
t per unit for supplying their skills to R&D or wt
for supplying them elsewhere (to implementation or manufacturing). They will all choose to work
in R&D if they can make strictly more income there than elsewhere; i.e. if w0
tσc(γ/at) >w tb σ.I n
equilibrium some skills must be supplied to manufacturing. Therefore:
w0
t/wt ≤ b σ/σc(γ/at) with strict equality if R&D occurs. (21)
Since anyone who can work in R&D can also work elsewhere:
w0
t/wt ≥ 1 if R&D occurs. (22)
3.2 R&D or implementation?





t with strict equality if implementation occurs












¢1/β with strict equality if implementation occurs. (24)
It follows that there are three distinct regions for the historically given value of at:
1. If at ≥ γ/f (b e) then no one needs to undertake any extra schooling to be able to work in R&D,
so they will continue to supply the unconstrained income-maximizing ￿ow of productivity-
adjusted skills b σ to the market. Only R&D will take place, because λ0 > λ implies that the
payoﬀ to R&D is strictly higher than the payoﬀ to implementation. There will be a single
price of skills in the economy, satisfying the research arbitrage equation (23) for R&D.28
2. If at < γ/f (b e) and
¡
λ0/λ
¢1/β ≥ b σ/σc (γ/at) then only R&D will take place in equilibrium.29
Workers who upgrade their skills levels to γAmax
t will earn a skill premium that just compen-
sates them for the extra time spent in education. The price of skills in R&D will be given by
the research arbitrage equation (23), while the price of skills in manufacturing will be given






that makes workers indiﬀerent between acquiring the unconstrained income-maximizing skill
level Atf (b e) and working in manufacturing or acquiring the minimal skill level γAmax
t to work
in R&D.
3. If at < γ/f (b e) and
¡
λ0/λ
¢1/β < b σ/σc (γ/at) then only implementation will occur in equilib-
rium, there will be a single price wt for skills in the economy, given by the research arbitrage
equation (5), and everyone will continue to supply the unconstrained income-maximizing ￿ow
of productivity-adjusted skills b σ to the market. No one will ￿nd it worthwhile spending time





¢1/β would not compensate for the reduction in available supply
σc (γ/at)/b σ implied by the extra time in education.
28More formally, in this case (20) and (21) imply that w
0
t ≤ wt. This, together with (24) and the fact that λ
0 > λ




29In the borderline case where the weak inequality holds with strict equality then the equilibrium mix between
implementation and R&D is indeterminate, but it turns out that the overall rate of innovation at that point is
independent of the mix. So with no eﬀect on the system dynamics to be described below, we assume that even in
this borderline case there will be no implementation, just R&D.
203.3 The dynamics of a follower country
In region 3 a country will continue to behave after the introduction of modern R&D just the same
way as it did before, but now facing a higher value of the global growth rate. The country￿s
dynamics will continue to be governed by (11) and (12), with gt equal to g0 instead of g.
In region 1 a country will behave as before, but with two changes. Not only will it face the
higher global growth rate, but also the price of skills will now obey the new research arbitrage
equation (23) instead of (5). Since the only diﬀerence between these equations is the value of λ,
the country￿s dynamics in this region will be the same as in region 3 but with λ replaced by λ0.
In region 2 the change goes beyond a change in one or two parameters because in this region, as
we saw in the preceding section, there will be a segmented labor market. Let χt be the equilibrium
fraction of people that choose to work in manufacturing. Then the supply of skills to manufacturing
will be χtAtb σ. In equilibrium this supply must equal the demand for skills in manufacturing:
χtb σ = e s(ωt).
Thus the supply of skills to R&D from the remaining fraction 1 − χt will be:
SR
t =( 1− χt)Atσc (γ/at)=
￿




By analogy to (6) the overall rate of innovation will be:





















































213.4 The eﬀects of modern R&D on a follower country
The three regions can be pieced together continuously as shown in Figure 3. The border between
regions 1 and 2 is de￿n e db yt h ec o n d i t i o nt h a t( 1 9 )h o l dw i t he q u a l i t y ,w h e r e a st h eb o r d e rb e t w e e n
regions 2 and 3 is de￿ned by the condition that:
¡
λ0/λ
¢1/β = b σ/σc (γ/a).
As before, the œ ω =0l o c u si se v e r y w h e r ed o w n w a r ds l o p i n g . 30 The œ a =0locus is upward sloping
in regions 1 and 3 but not necessarily in region 2. Thus there is a possibility of multiple steady
states, as depicted in Figure 3, where one implementation steady state and two R&D steady states
exist, all of them with a∗ > 0. Intuitively, a country with low normalized productivity will be unable
to access modern R&D, which will keep its normalized productivity from rising, while one with high
normalized productivity can access the means of keeping it high. Generically, the odd numbered
steady states are well-behaved saddle points and the even numbered ones are unreachable sources.
There are also two possible kinds of non-R&D steady states. In Figure 3 there is an ￿implemen-
tation￿ steady state with a∗ > 0 and a growth rate equal to the world rate g. F i g u r e4s h o w sac a s e
where there is a unique ￿stagnation￿ steady-state, with a∗ =0 , as in Figure 2b above, and a growth
rate strictly less than g. In both of these non-R&D steady states all technology investment takes
the form of implementation rather than R&D. The only diﬀerence between the implementation
steady state and the stagnation steady state is whether or not the countries absorptive capacity
r e m a i n ss t r o n ge n o u g ht ok e e pu pw i t ht h et e c h n o l o g i c a lf r o n t i e r .
How the introduction of modern R&D aﬀects a country￿s growth path depends on which region
it was in to begin with. From Figure 3 it is clear that if a country￿s initial steady state is in region 1,
and there is a steady state in region 1 after the introduction of modern R&D, then the system must
converge to that new steady state, where all technology investment takes the form of R&D. The
qualitative change in such a country￿s steady-state normalized productivity a∗ can be analyzed by
changing g to g0 and λ to λ0 in the steady-state equations (17) and (18). As Proposition 2 indicates,
the increase in g tends to reduce a∗ while the increase in λ t e n d st or a i s ei t ,s ot h eo v e r a l le ﬀect on
a∗ is ambiguous. (In region 1, the increase in g shifts the œ a =0locus to the left without altering
the œ ω =0locus, while the increase in λ shifts both loci to the right.) In the case of the leader
country, as we have seen, the overall eﬀect is to leave a∗ unchanged. By continuity there will be
almost no eﬀect on a∗ in a country whose parameter values are close to those of the leader.
30To see that it is downward-sloping in regime 2, note that, by construction, the function σc in equation (27) is
non-increasing.
22At the other extreme, a country that starts with its initial steady state in region 3 must converge
to a new steady-state in region 3, where all R&D takes the form of implementation. This is because
in region 3 the eﬀect of introducing modern R&D is to shift the œ a =0curve to the left, with no
change in the œ ω =0locus. Thus if the initial steady state is in region 3 then there is also a
new steady state in region 3, with smaller a∗ and larger ω∗. As Figure 5 indicates, this can be
an interior equilibrium, as in Figure 2a above, where the country continues to grow at the same
rate g0 as the leader country. But if the economy starts with too small a normalized productivity,
and the increase in g is large enough, then the œ a =0locus will shift by so much that it no longer
h a sa ni n t e r i o ri n t e r s e c t i o nw i t ht h eœ ω =0locus, and the new steady state will be a degenerate
equilibrium with a∗ =0and a growth rate strictly less than g0, as discussed earlier in section 2.6
and illustrated in Figure 2b.
Thus even though all countries are assumed to have started in the same interior steady-state
equilibrium, growing at the common rate g, the rise in world growth instigated by the introduction
of modern R&D will create three groups, in three distinct steady-state equilibria, as illustrated in
Figure 1 above.31 More formally:
Proposition 3 Following the introduction of modern R&D there are three diﬀerent steady states
that a country can converge to:
A) R&D (region 1 or 2): All technology investment takes the form of R&D. The country grows
a tt h es a m er a t eg0 as the leader. Its normalized productivity a∗ can be greater or less than in
the original steady state. The leader country converges to such a steady state, with an unchanged
normalized productivity a∗
1 =1 /(1 + σ1).
B) Implementation (region 3, interior): All technology investment takes the form of implemen-
tation. The country grows at the same rate g0 as the leader. Its normalized productivity a∗ is
non-negative but the steady-state productivity gap a∗
1/a∗ between it and the leader country is larger
than before.
C) Stagnation (region 3, corner): All technology investment takes the form of implementation.
The country grows at a rate strictly less than g0. The productivity gap between it and the leader
country rises without bound.
The three groups referred to in Proposition 3 are de￿ned in terms of their average productivity
31If we had begun with two groups (by assuming that initially there were some countries already in the stagnation
steady state shown in Figure 2b above) then the introduction of modern R&D would still create the same three new
groups. Moreover, the gap between the leader and the stagnating countries would start to widen even faster than
before.
23parameters At. In terms of income per person (as de￿n e db ye q u a t i o n( 1 3 )a b o v e )t h o s ec o u n t r i e s
in the stagnation group C will have an asymptotic growth rate less than that of the leader, and
those in the implementation group B will have the same asymptotic growth rate as the leader. It




ωb σ + ψb π (ω)
ω1b σ + ψ1b π(ω1)
necessarily rises between a country in group B and the leader, because the respective eﬃciency-
adjusted skill prices ω and ω1 in the two countries will rise, which could conceivably oﬀset the fall in
a. However, it is easy to show that if the coeﬃcient β on skills in the innovation technology is close
enough to zero (it is exactly zero in Howitt (2000)) then neither ω nor ω1 will be aﬀe c t e dm u c hb y
the change, so the fall in a implies that this income gap will widen, just like the productivity gap.
3.5 Sorting into convergence groups
One advantage of this model is that not only does it explain how diﬀerent convergence groups might
form but it helps to identify which countries will belong to which group. The discussion immediately
preceding Proposition 3, taken together with Proposition 2, suggests that those countries with
relatively large values ψ and φ and low values of τ will be most likely to be in group A, because
t h o s ea r em o s tl i k e l yt oh a v ei n i t i a la n d￿nal steady states in region 1. Likewise, among those
countries whose initial steady state was in region 3 and who therefore will end up in group B or
group C, those with the lowest values of ψ and φ and the highest values of τ will be those who join
group C.
More precisely, take any country and consider what would have happened if its innovation-
subsidy rate φ had been larger than it was, both before and after the introduction of modern R&D.
In terms of the phase diagram illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the eﬀect would have been to shift
the œ ω =0locus up for all values of a. H e n c ea l lt h er e a c h a b l es t e a d ys t a t e sw i t ha>0 would have
been shifted to the right, and the values of a for which œ a>0 on the equilibrium saddle path would
have been strictly augmented. As a result, starting from any given initial position, the country￿s
new steady-state value of a would have been at least as large as it is. Moreover, by Proposition 2,
the country￿s initial value (the pre-modern steady-state value) of a would have been larger than it
is, which by itself would also have resulted in at least as large a new steady-state value.
Thus ceteris paribus, the larger is φ the larger (weakly) will be a country￿s new steady-state
value of a. It follows that if two countries diﬀer only in their values of φ a n dt h ec o u n t r yw i t ht h e
lower value joins the leading convergence group A then so does the other one; the former must have
24a new steady state in region 1 or 2 and hence so must the latter. Likewise if the country with the
higher value stagnates, joining group C with a → 0, then so must the other.
The same reasoning is valid if for an increase in φ we substitute an increase in the eﬃciency
parameter ψ or a decrease in the saving tax rate τ, the only diﬀerence being that in the case of
an increase in ψ not only does the œ ω =0locus shift up, the œ a =0locus also shifts down. The
reasoning is also valid if we substitute for an increase in φ any combination of these three qualitative
parameter changes. Thus we have:
Proposition 4 Consider any two countries belonging to diﬀerent convergence groups.
1) If one country is converging to an R&D steady state (group A) then:
(a) its eﬃciency parameter ψ is larger than the other￿s,
(b) its innovation-subsidy rate φ is larger than the other￿s, or
(a) its saving-tax rate τ is smaller than the other￿s.
2) If one country is converging to a stagnation steady state (group C) then:
(a) its eﬃciency parameter ψ is smaller than the other￿s,
(b) its innovation-subsidy rate φ is smaller than the other￿s, or
(a) its saving-tax rate τ is larger than the other￿s.
The importance of Proposition 4 is not only that it helps us to identify which country will
belong to which group. In combination with Proposition 2 it also implies that the countries that
converge to an R&D steady state (group A) will tend to be those whose relative productivity was
among the highest to begin with, and that those who converge to stagnation (group C) will tend
to be those whose relative productivity was among the lowest to begin with. This is important
because if there were a substantial cross-over of groups then the gap between the leader and those
in the stagnation group could actually narrow for some time before eventually widening, so the
model would not imply divergence, just multiple steady states.
In fact, most evidence suggests that there is a large positive correlation across countries in
parameters that aﬀect growth positively. Indeed this is one of the main obstacles to drawing
inferences from cross-country growth regressions. If countries were ranked the same in terms of
all three of the parameters then there would be no crossover at all following the introduction of
modern R&D:
25Corollary to Proposition 4 If the ranking of countries by eﬃciency parameters ψ is the same
as the ranking by innovation-subsidy rates φ, and the inverse of the ranking by saving-tax rates τ,
then a country that is converging to an R&D steady state (group A) started with a higher average
productivity than one that is not, and a country that is converging to stagnation (group C) started
with a lower average productivity than one that is not.
Intuitively, those countries with the greatest productivity to begin with will be those whose skills
will be suﬃciently advanced to use the new method of R&D, and who will therefore join group A.
L i k e w i s et h o s ew i t ht h el o w e s tp r o d u c t i v i t yt ob e g i nw i t hw i l lb et h o s ei nw h i c ha b s o r p t i v ec a p a c i t y
is already so low that further erosion caused by an acceleration of the frontier will tip them into
joining group C, while those joining group B will tend to be those whose productivity was initially
in the middle of the distribution - - too low to use the new technique of R&D but high enough that
even after some erosion they will have enough absorptive capacity to keep up with the technological
frontier.
4 Window of opportunity for lagging economies
Suppose that some countries do not have in place the institutions to support modern R&D when
it is introduced. Then there may be only a ￿nite period of time ￿a window of opportunity￿ for
the country to set up these institutions. After this, the erosion of its absorptive capacity induced
by technological advance in the leading country will trap the lagging country in implementation
or stagnation. This is illustrated in Figure 6, where we show a country whose parameter values
are identical to those of the leading country, and where we assume the existence of three distinct
equilibria as in Figure 3.
So long as the institutions supporting R&D are not put into place in this country, it will follow
a trajectory leading to the implementation steady state. Once R&D becomes possible, a new R&D
steady state appears, at the original level of normalized productivity 1/(1 + σ1). If this happens
at time t0, the country￿s path will be identical to the leading country￿s, and it will go immediately
to the new R&D steady state. As long as it happens before the country￿s normalized productivity
has fallen below the critical value a de￿ned by the new steady state in region 2 (as at at1 in
Figure 6) the decline will be reversed and the economy will go asymptotically to the same new
R&D steady state as the leading country. But if the new institutions are put into place after at has
descended below a (as at at2 in Figure 6), it will continue to follow a path to the new implementation
equilibrium. The example depicted in Figure 6 can be modi￿ed so that the steady state in region
263 is an stagnation equilibrium as in Figure 2b, without changing the analysis. Thus we have our
￿window of opportunity￿ result:
Proposition 5 An economy may have a ￿nite time period during which it can achieve an R&D
steady state by establishing the institutions supporting R&D, and after which it will be trapped in
implementation or stagnation if has not yet established these institutions.
4.1 Present Day Windows of Opportunity
The history of the industrialization and development of several countries, amongst them Denmark,
Sweden, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Ireland has been characterized by periods of high,
sustained growth sometimes called miracle growth. Other countries, including Argentina, India,
Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico have experienced long periods of sustained economic growth but then
failed to reach the status of full development (see Ugo Pipitone, 1995 for a historical discussion of
the ￿rst ￿ve and last four cases). These diﬀerent phenomena may result from technological windows
of opportunity that open up and then close at various times. We give an explanation of how this
might occur.
The leading edge technological level Amax
t represents a mix of technologies. During the history of
technological growth there has been a sequence of dominant or even general purpose technologies,
such as the steam engine, electricity, trains, automobiles, telecommunication, plastics, chemical
technologies, information, etc. These have diﬀerent characteristic innovation productivities for
implementation and R&D and diﬀerent human capital requirement for R&D. Thus, the parameters
λ, λ0 and γ may shift over time, re￿ecting medium- to long-term changes in these productivities and
requirements as the dominant technologies change. For example, technologies requiring for their
implementation a higher level of skills for a larger proportion of the population in eﬀect require a
higher human capital threshold level.
What this means is that the critical values for the existence of a low-technology trap may
change. If implementation becomes relatively easier, the trap may disappear for countries with
better scienti￿c institutions and parameters for growth. To the extent that they increase the world
growth rate gt (of Amax
t ), however, their success may strengthen the implementation trap for other
countries, which will not experience the window of opportunity.
If a country is originally in region 3 (implementation) and opportunity appears to transit to
the higher equilibrium (either because scienti￿c institutions were put into place in time or because
changes in parameters led to the disappearance of the low technology trap), it will ￿rst continue
27implementing and then begin innovating, a well-known pattern in the case of, for example, the Asian
growth miracles. Bloom and Williamson (1998) show how growth in these countries coincided with
a demographic window of opportunity in which a lower dependency ratio increased the saving rate.
Our model provides a reason why not all countries reaching the demographic window of opportunity
will develop: they might not ￿nd themselves in a position to reach the high technology steady state.
Similarly, the advent of a new technology for which implementation is more diﬃcult may push
some countries into stagnation, by making implementation unpro￿table. Alternatively, the exhaus-
tion of the easy part of a new technology may close a transition window that may have been open,
by raising the threshold levels necessary for R&D. A whole set of countries could experience a
period of sustained growth followed by a period of low growth.
Although the competition of ideas is enough for miracles in some countries to diminish the
opportunity for miracles in others, trade in the products which are the subject of technological
advance probably strengthens this eﬀect, by discouraging production and innovation in less prepared
countries in precisely those technologies which more prepared countries are using to grow.
According to our model, the emergence of Asia, together with the arrival of the general purpose
information technologies, could be contributing factors for the lost decades of growth in Latin
America, and its consequent permanence in an implementation equilibrium, and for the permanence
of Africa in a stagnation equilibrium. Maloney (2002) has used this framework to compare the
development of Latin America with countries such as Australia, Sweden and Finland, ￿nding that
de￿cient human capital accumulation determining technological capabilities may have played a role
in its failure to develop.
5 Conclusions
We model skill acquisition and technological dynamics when technology investment can take the
form of modern R&D or technological implementation. This dichotomy, kept alive by the ever larger
skill-level necessary for R&D, gives rise to three convergence clubs, characterized respectively by
R&D, implementation and stagnation. Applied to the origin of 20th Century growth, the model
explains the simultaneous emergence of large income inequalities between countries. It also implies
that after an initial widening of the distribution the most advanced countries (not just those that
perform leading-edge R&D) should converge to parallel growth paths, in line with the empirical
￿ndings of the convergence literature. Technology transfer is powerful enough to bring about this
degree of convergence between the R&D and implementation clubs, but it is not powerful enough
28to overcome the erosion of absorptive capacity causing divergence between the stagnation club and
others. Once R&D takes oﬀ, the erosion of absorptive capacity in laggard countries implies that
only a ￿nite window of opportunity may exist for them to set up the scienti￿c institutional supports
of modern R&D, so as to join the leading countries in development.
It remains to incorporate physical capital accumulation into the analysis, and to see what
diﬀerence the degree of capital mobility makes. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the results
are robust to capital accumulation. It also suggests that capital mobility tends to amplify the
disadvantage of backwardness that is central to our analysis. That is, capital tends to move away
from technologically more backward areas and toward the frontier; through a scale eﬀect this
reduces the incentive to innovate in the laggard country, causing it to fall even further behind the
leader technologically.
The model is consistent with a highly demanding set of facts pertaining to the current distribu-
tion of income and factors of production among countries. It also is consistent with the persistence
of relative economic conditions since the colonial era. It explains why economic miracles are pos-
sible in modern-day windows of opportunity for development and also why whole sets of countries
may be simultaneously aﬄicted with prolonged periods of slow economic growth when technological
implementation becomes more diﬃcult.
Economic policy aimed at fostering growth should stress technological change and skill acqui-
sition. Facilitating technological implementation, opening knowledge ￿ows, fostering knowledge
institutions and promoting human capital investment are key factors for increasing productivity.
Once good rates of technological implementation are achieved, well-targeted policies may make it
easier to identify and overcome speci￿c thresholds constituting obstacles for technological change,
thus dissipating low-technology traps. At an average rate of growth of 2%, only 33 countries lagged
less than 50 years behind the U.S. in 1995, while the bottom 73 countries in the World Bank data
base were more than a century behind. Perhaps the appropriate human capital and technologi-
cal policies can produce not just parallel economic growth and poverty alleviation but economic
miracles.
However, once a country has missed its windows of opportunity, it faces a more diﬃcult task
than before, because creating the conditions for an R&D steady state to exist is no longer suﬃcient
for the steady state to be reached. At this point, a ￿big push￿ is needed to reverse the erosion
of absorptive capacity and join the leading convergence club. Whether or not a poor country is
capable of engineering the push on its own remains an important open question.
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Figure 5: A country that starts in Region 3 must go to an implementation steady state (as 
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Figure 6: Windows of opportunity. If the country adopts the institutions 
supporting modern R&D before its normalized productivity falls below a, it 
can reverse course and move to the R&D steady state. Otherwise it will 
become trapped in the implementation (or stagnation) region 3. 
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